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Abstract
In 1961, J.R Lucas published an argument which called on Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem to show that the mind could not be simulated by a Turing machine. Though
widely criticized, his sentiment found sympathy with mathematical physicist Roger
Penrose, who published a new Go¨delian argument in his 1994 book ”Shadows of the
Mind”. However the idealizations necessary to get these arguments off the ground are
substantial. Because of this, the scope of their conclusion is limited. In this paper,
I’ll appeal to these limitations to argue that there can be robust and useful versions
of the computational theory of mind which hold up even in the face of the Go¨delian
arguments of Lucas and Penrose. More specifically, I contend that the arguments of
Lucas and Penrose do not disqualify any computational theory of mind that is not
already ruled out by the much less controversial results of Go¨del and Benacerraf.
1 Background
Since its conception in the seminal work of Alan Turing, the formal notion of computabil-
ity has been closely connected with the reasoning abilities of actual people. Indeed Turing
makes this connection explicit saying: ”We may compare a man in the process of comput-
ing a real number to a machine which is only capable of a finite number of conditions”
[25]. It comes as no surprise then that computation was eventually turned back towards
a rigorous treatment of traditional questions about the mind. These methods, pioneered
by McCulloch and Pitts as early as 1943[18], attempt to explain the mind as being a com-
plicated computing machine with its own unique set of formalisms. Such attempts proved
to be remarkably effective, resulting in a long period of popularity for computationalist
theories. And as more and more powerful computers are developed, these theories which
treat the mind as a computing machine are only becoming more plausible.
However, these theories are not without their critics. One particularly interesting line
of criticism appeals to Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem. Go¨del himself noticed this
application of his theorem and presented it as follows in his 1951 Gibbs Lecture: ”Either...
the human mind (even in the realm of pure mathematics) infinitely surpasses the powers
of any finite machine, or else there exist absolutely unsolvable diophantine equations”[10].
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Go¨del uses diophantine equations to drive his point home to an audience of mathematicians,
but the general conclusion is this: Either the mind’s ability to prove true mathematical
propositions exceeds machine’s ability to do so, or we can never prove every true proposition
of mathematics. But the second disjunct doesn’t sit well with our normal mathematical
optimism. After all, experience has shown that if we just keep at it long enough, eventually
we can decide even the most difficult problems (e.g. Fermat’s Last Theorem)1. We see
then that Go¨del’s conclusion is a measured one. All it shows with certainty is that this
interesting disjunction holds. His reasons for thinking we should endorse one disjunct over
the other are meta-mathematical. Mathematics proper, Go¨del contends, has nothing more
to say on the matter.
But others have argued that the incompleteness theorems make a stronger case against
computationalism. Chief among them is J.R. Lucas. Lucas argues in his 1961 paper
”Minds, Machines, and Go¨del”[15] that the incompleteness theorems show with mathe-
matical certainty that our minds are more powerful than machines. His argument (which
I’ll reconstruct in the next section) evoked a huge response in the literature. And while the
vast majority of these respondents were critical of Lucas’ argument, mathematical physi-
cist Roger Penrose found it compelling enough to fashion his own attempt at a Go¨delian
argument. His first attempt, published in his 1989 book ”The Emperor’s New Mind”[21],
is very similar to Lucas’ original argument and thus contains the same defects. But his
new argument, given in his 1994 book ”Shadows of the Mind”[20], represents a significant
departure from the logical structure of Lucas’ original. This is why the new argument has
proven to be much harder to refute. In fact, as I’ll clarify later in this paper, Penrose’s new
argument puts us in a puzzling dilemma. The dilemma stems from Penrose’s assumption
of the soundness of normal mathematical practice. If this assumption is granted then, due
to the logical properties of soundness, his argument goes through almost immediately. So
Penrose’s critics have taken issue with this assumption. But now things get tricky. On the
one hand we are trying to defend computationalist approaches to cognition because they
offer a powerful tool for understanding cognition. But in the course of this defense we are
forced to appeal to an unseemly fact about soundness; namely, that whenever you assume
a soundness scheme in the object language, absurdity immediately follows. It is the project
of this paper to construct a defense that avoids this complication. To do so I’ll look at the
assumptions involved in these Go¨delian arguments, and argue that they divorce Penrose’s
argument from most plausible computationalist accounts of cognition. So now we should
look at these assumptions.
1Or, if we cannot decide them within a certain framework, at least we can understand clearly why not
and in what framework we could, as was the case with Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem
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2 The Go¨delian Dialectic
2.1 Idealizing Assumptions
The way these Go¨delian arguments proceed is to consider the set of all arithmetic sentences
that a particular person asserts which we can call K, following Shapiro2[24]. They then
assume that there is a Turing machine that would output all the members of K. Craig’s
theorem [6] says that any recursively enumberable set of sentences can be recursively ax-
iomatized, so we can associate with this Turing machine a recursively axiomatized system
F. By Go¨del’s theorem, if F is consistent, then there is a sentence that is true in F but
that F doesn’t prove. Since we understand Go¨del’s theorem though, we could see that this
sentence is true and thus it would be in K. So this contradicts the assumption that K is
output by the Turing machine because there is a member of K that the machine doesn’t
output; namely, its own Go¨del sentence.
What then are the set-theoretic characteristics of K? It must be finite because the
mathematician whose output determines K can only do so many problems before he dies.
But the Go¨delian can’t accept this because for any finite set there is a Turing machine that
outputs all and only the members of that set and then halts. So nothing about K would
go beyond what is mechanically computable. To avoid this issue, we idealize away from
things like lifespan and a finite number of particles in the known universe, and call K the
set of sentences our mathematician would output with unlimited time and resources. So
K is countably infinite.
The other main stipulation is that all of the members of K have to be true. So in a
sense we’re assuming an underlying competence of our mathematician, and simply ignoring
any slips of concentration/judgement that might happen along the way. This assumption,
on the meta-level where this debate is happening, guarantees us the consistency of K. This
is a crucial assumption for the Go¨delian to make. If we consider the actual set of outputs
of our mathematician, warts and all, the set will certainly be inconsistent. But then, even
if we’re not sure a machine could output all the members of that set, one could output all
the sentences logically entailed by that set. Specifically, the set of all arithmetic sentences.
So K has to be consistent, or else the Go¨delian loses by default (kind of). Restricting K
to only true sentences prevents this. We have now that K is a countably infinite set of
theorems of arithmetic which represents the output of some very idealized mathematician.
We will take it on faith that this set is well-defined and that we do in fact refer to a specific
set when we write or say ’K’. The next task is now to take a detailed look at the arguments
Lucas and Penrose give.
2We could just as well take K to be the output of some community of mathematicians or even all
mathematicians in general, but there is nothing to be gained by this and it complicates the idealizations.
So for ease of presentation we’ll leave K as some arbitrary individual’s output.
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2.2 Lucas
Having made explicit the idealizations needed to get this argument up and running, we
can now rigorously reconstruct Lucas’ argument as follows:
1. Assume for reductio that there is a Turing machine W that outputs all the members
of K.
2. This Turing machine, as shown above, has a set of outputs equivalent to the set of
propositions provable by some formal system F
3. By the first incompleteness theorem, there is an arithmetic Go¨del sentence GF that
is true, but not provable in the system F.
4. A human mathematician can see GF to be true because he understands Go¨del’s
theorem.
5. By 3 and 4, GF ∈ K but GF /∈ F
6. So W 6= K, contradicting 1.
7. By reductio, there is no Turing Machine that outputs all the members of K
In this way Lucas purports to have shown that no Turing machine can simulate human
arithmetical practice, and so minds outstrip machines. But whether he actually shows
this to be the case is doubtful, as evidenced by the large amount of criticism he received
after the article was published. The canonical objection is due to Putnam (1960)[22].
Putnam points out that the first incompleteness theorem doesn’t establish that GF is true.
Rather, it establishes the conditional Con(F)→ GF where Con(F) is the typical arithmetic
statement of consistency for a system. But why should we think our mathematician knows
Con(F) to be true? After all, F might be an incredibly complicated system, and so he
would have no way of determining whether it was consistent or not. But if he doesn’t
know Con(F), then he can’t conclude GF and so 4 no longer holds true. Thus, the reductio
fails and mechanism is revived according to Putnam. So in order to save his argument,
Lucas needs to secure the truth of Con(F)
Lucas’ first attempt[16] at doing so is to claim that Putnam misunderstands the dialec-
tical nature of the original argument. To him this is not a specific argument but rather
an argument schema which is to be adapted depending on the particular Turing Machine
that is advanced. Thus we get Con(F) simply from the candidacy of machine W. If Con(F)
is false, then the output of W is inconsistent. But no mechanist would advance an in-
consistent machine as modeling K. So they are committed to asserting Con(F) as well.
Because the mechanist has secured Con(F) for us through their assertion that W outputs
K, the argument goes through as planned. Or that’s what Lucas argues anyway. Further,
because it is an effective matter to list all the possible Turing Machines, Lucas could be
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his own interlocutor, listing a Turing machine and subsequently showing that he is not
that particular machine. In fact, he could spend forever going about this Sisyphean task,
proving W1 6= K, W2 6= K, W3 6= K and so forth. So in this way even if he concedes that
his proposed argument is only a schema, it is in no way less powerful than the original.
This response has received its own fair share of criticism. David Lewis for one argues
(1979) that it doesn’t get Lucas out of trouble[13]. To demonstrate why not, he has us
consider two Turing Machines. Let’s call the first one WM and the second WNM . The first
machine is taken to simulate Lucas’ normal theorem proving activity, while the second is to
mimic his activity when accused of being a particular machine with Go¨del number n. From
this Lewis poses a dilemma: When Lucas produces the Go¨del sentence for the machine the
mechanist says matches his output, which machine exactly is this the Go¨del sentence of?
Assume it is the Go¨del sentence for WNM . In this case the position is exactly that of the
original. We have no reason to suspect that Lucas can verify this sentence to be true, and
thus he has not outdone the machine. Assume that it is instead the Go¨del sentence of WM .
However, this sentence may very well be in the output of WNM , and thus Lucas again has
not beaten the machine. This would seem to show that the ”dialectical nature” of Lucas’
argument fails to save it.
2.2.1 Response from Selectivity
Another tack that Lucas takes in showing that we must be consistent is to point out that we
will not assert just any arithmetic sentence. However, a formal system that is inconsistent
will prove any sentence, so a Turing Machine that instantiates such a system would have an
indiscriminate output. But we are discriminate in which arithmetic sentences we’re willing
to assert, so we cannot be such a machine.
Though intuitively plausible, this response won’t get Lucas out of trouble either. The
issue is that he equivocates between the axioms of a formal system and the theory entailed
by those axioms. To illustrate this consider the Turing machine that, when started on a
blank piece of tape, writes the binary code for ’0=1’ and ’0 6= 1’ and then halts. Clearly this
machine is inconsistent. But whether it ”asserts” every sentence of arithmetic depends on
how we define its output. If we take its output as just those sentences which it writes down
before halting, then there are an infinite number of sentences it didn’t assert. So it is just
as selective as Lucas, or anyone else for that matter. If we take its output instead to be the
set of sentences entailed by ’0=1’ and ’0 6= 1’ under the typical rules of inference for first
order logic, then Lucas is right; its output is just the set of all arithmetic sentences. Under
this definition of output we have no reason to believe Lucas is selective in which sentences
he asserts either. Unless he has never asserted two contradictory arithmetic statements,
under this broad understanding of output Lucas actually outputs all sentences too. So to
show us he was indeed more selective than the machine, he would have to show that he is
consistent. If he could do that, he would win regardless because no machine is capable of
showing its own consistency. We have no reason to think he can, though. So he is back to
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where he started, with nothing to show for worrying about selectivity.
2.2.2 Gentzen and Transfinite Consistency Proofs
One interesting response Lucas has given appeals to Gerhard Gentzen’s 1938 consistency
proof for arithmetic[8]. In response to the charge that we can’t establish Con(F) and thus
don’t know GF , Lucas cites this consistency proof, arguing that just because we can’t prove
Con(F) via arithmetic methods, doesn’t rule out our having mathematical ways of doing
so. In particular, Gentzen’s. But once we’ve established Con(F), we get GF and so his
anti-mechanistic proof goes through.
This seems like an ill-advised tactic though, given the nature of Gentzen’s proof. The
proof itself relies on a reduction method for derivations of a contradiction (or in Gentzenian
terms, sequents ending in the empty set) and an induction principle on transfinite ordinals
up to 0. The reduction method postulates that there is a sequent of arbitrary complexity
ending in the empty set. Then it shows how this if that sequent exists, then a less complex
one exists, and so on and so on. The procedure terminates in a minimally complex sequent
ending in the empty set. But it is shown that this sequent cannot be derived, so there
cannot be an arbitrarily complex sequent ending in the empty set. But if arithmetic were
inconsistent there would have to be. So arithmetic is consistent.
While at first glance this might seem like just the proof Lucas needed, it doesn’t actually
gain him any ground. Because although the methods in this proof are not finitary, as von
Plato points out in his SEP article on the subject (2014) they are completely constructive.
And as such, they should be accessible to a Turing machine. So again, Lucas has been
matched by a new machine which he needs to show to be consistent. But Gentzen’s
subsequent proof established that the consistency of the induction principle + PA is not
provable in ordinary arithmetic [9], so Lucas seems unable to do so. Since he can’t know
the new machine to be consistent, he cannot know its Go¨del sentence to be true, and so
his argument fails again.
2.3 Penrose’s New Argument
So despite a valiant defense, Lucas’ anti-mechanistic arguments appear to be beyond repair.
Now let’s look at the argument Roger Penrose gives in Chapter 3 of ”Shadows of the Mind”.
The argument is summarized in a dialogue between a programmer (Albert Imperator aka
AI) and a super computer he designed. The computer tells Albert that the theorems it have
proven are all ”unassailably” true, and Albert tells the machine that it can be considered
equivalent to a Turing-Machine M. The computer protests, saying that if Albert could
know both of these were true, then there would be a theorem that Albert could prove that
it couldn’t- a possibility its robotic pride won’t admit. In response Albert has the robot
consider the theory T(M) defined to be the set of all sentences which follow ”unassailably”
from those outputted by M and the assumption that it is equivalent to M. The robot then
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concludes by the following argument that it cannot in fact be equivalent to M:
1. Assume that I am equivalent to the Turing machine M.
2. Because all the sentences I output are unassailably known, all the sentences I output
are true.
3. By (1) and (2), all the sentences output by M are true.
4. Because all the sentences output by M are true, all the sentences in T(M) are true.
5. Because M is recursively enumerable, T(M) is effectively generated, and so itself
recursively enumerable.
6. So T(M) is equivalent to some Turing Machine M’, instantiating some formal system
F’.
7. By Go¨del’s theorem, F’ has a Go¨del sentence such that GF ′ is equivalent to Con(F’)
and GF ′ /∈ F’ .
8. By (4) all members of T(M) are true, so F’ is consistent
9. So GF ′ is true.
10. Discharging (1), I conclude if I am equivalent to M, then GF ′ is true.
11. By definition then GF ′ ∈ T(M) and so GF ′ ∈ F’. But this contradicts (7).
12. So I am not equivalent to M, by reductio.3
2.3.1 Criticism of the New Argument-Assumption of Soundness
The most damning critiques of this new argument focus on its assumption of soundness in
(2). The standard objection along these lines is raised by Chalmers and Shapiro [4][24].
They object that once we have introduced a soundness scheme that is accessible in the
object language, it’s a simple thing to derive a contradiction. To highlight this, let’s define
the predicate K(pφq) so that K(pφq) ⇐⇒ φ is ”unassailably known”. Let’s assume further
that K(x) fulfills the standard requirements of a Hilbert- Bernays provability predicate for
PA (because if our robot knows a theorem of arithmetic unassailably, then it only makes
sense it has found a proof for it in PA or some weaker system). So explicitly:
1. If PA ` φ, then PA ` K(pφq)
3It should be noted that while Penrose takes this argument to be a refutation of the hypothesis that
we are actually machines, it does just as much work against the idea that our arithmetic practice can be
simulated by machines. Simply change statements like ”I am equivalent to M” to ”My arithmetic output
is equivalent to that of M”, and the argument goes through just the same against this weaker hypothesis.
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2. PA ` K( pφ→ ψq) → (K(pφq) → K(pψq))
3. PA ` K(pφq) → K(pK(pφq)q)
From here then we can derive a material implication version of Lo¨bs theorem for K(x)
of the form: K(¬ K(pφq) ∨ φ) → K(pφq). But when we introduce the soundness scheme
K(pφq) → φ then we run into trouble. For any φ either K(pφq) or ¬ K(pφq). In the
former case, the soundness scheme gives us φ outright. In the latter case ¬ K(pφq) gives
us itself. But in both cases, the antecedent in Lo¨b’s theorem has been fulfilled and so we
can conclude K(pφq) for all φ. One more application of the soundness scheme tells us that
any sentence φ whatsoever is true! This is clearly absurd, so there is something wrong with
assuming the soundness of K.
This is very much along the lines of what Chalmers concludes. Shapiro notes this
fact, but then proceeds to the more fundamental worry that the statement itself of the
soundness schema is problematic. Both of these are good things to worry about, but they
seem troubling to our normal mathematical intuition. A mathematician doesn’t only think
the methods he is using are sound when he goes home and does meta-logic regarding what
he accomplished during the day. He must think that his methods are sound when he is
actually using them. Otherwise what reason could he give, in that moment, for using them
as opposed to some other? This is an unresolved issue for logicians, but still, a defense
of the computational theory of mind that avoids it would be preferable. So it is at least
worthwhile to look at some of the other responses to Penrose’s new argument which don’t
involve questions about soundness.4
2.3.2 Per Lindstro¨m
One such objection comes from Per Lindstro¨m [14], and goes as follows.
1. Let M be the Turing-Machine which supposedly models my
∏
1 arithmetic output.
2. Let the output of M be equivalent to some set F of
∏
1 sentences plus the sentence
¬Con(F).
3. By Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem this set is consistent.
4. Under the assumption that I am sound, M is sound.
5. If M is sound, then M is consistent.
6. So Con(M) ∈ T(M).
4Interestingly, Penrose’s assumption of soundness gets his own theory of mind into trouble because the
quantum computing Penrose postulates accounts for consciousness has built into it an infinitesimal chance
of error. So as the number of outputs of our idealized human quantum computer goes to∞, the probability
of error goes to 1. So the idealized mathematicians’ output cannot be sound.
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7. But since F ⊂ M, Con(M) implies Con(F).
8. Since T(M) is closed under deduction, Con(F) ∈ T(M).
9. But since M ⊂ T(M), ¬Con(F) ∈ T(M).
10. So Con(F) and ¬Con(F) are members of T(M) and therefore T(M) is inconsistent.
11. Therefore T(M) is not sound.
But 11* acts as a counter example to the premise (3) of Penrose’s argument, so it doesn’t
go through.
Although Lindstro¨m’s tactic here appears to be to show that one of Penrose’s premises is
not always true, it is really just a soundness concern in disguise. Notice that the assumption
5* features importantly in Lindstro¨m’s argument. The disguise then is that he contests
a later premise in Penrose’s argument, but is still using the assumption of soundness to
derive a contradiction in the course of that contesting. So Lindstro¨m’s objection, while
subtle, isn’t what we’re looking for.
2.3.3 Bringsjord and Arkoudas
Another objection to Penrose’s new argument is due to Bringsjord and Arkoudas [3]. They
claim that Penrose conflates the object language with the metalanguage and that once we
set those straight, there is no contradiction at all. Specifically, they claim ”(1) G(F) is
true on the one hand, and yet (2), which says that F cannot conclude G(F), is true on the
other. But wait a minute; look closer here. Where is the contradiction,exactly? There is
no contradiction. The reason is that (1) is a meta-mathematical assertion; it is a claim
about satisfaction”. This is an interesting claim, and would be a serious charge against
Penrose were it true.
Fortunately for Penrose, it’s not. In fact, Bringsjord and Arkoudas seem to have missed
the subtlety of Penrose’s new argument completely. First of all, instead of characterizing
T(M) as the set of all sentences that unassailably follow from M’s output and the hypothesis
that ”I am M”, they describe is as the set-theoretic union of these two. This is not what
Penrose meant though, and the distinction is important for his argument. This might
explain why they claim Penrose finds the fact that G(F’) is true and the fact that F’
doesn’t decide G(F’) to be contradictory, which of course he doesn’t. So while they are
certainly right to point out that there is some reckless back and forth between the object
language and the meta-language, their claim that this undermines Penrose’s argument on
its own is rather unconvincing.
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3 A new criticism of the New Argument
So now the dialectic sits at an interesting juncture. The most effective counterarguments
against Penrose show his assumption of soundness to lead to logical contradiction. But in
doing so they run headlong into a fundamental problem in the foundations of mathematics.
This seems unideal. We want to be able to defend computational accounts from Penrose
without diving into a host of foundational debates. For the rest of the paper I’ll attempt
to give such a defense. The tactic will be to grant Penrose that the new argument is valid,
but that the assumptions it needs to make to invoke Go¨del’s theorem are not assumptions
involved in some computational theories of mind. As such, they offer the mechanist a good
place to resist Penrose. The main idealization I’ll worry about are 1) That humans are
sound5 and 2) that CTM gives the actual algorithm to model human output. I’ll then show
how these assumptions Penrose takes as granted entail epistemic commitments for CTM
that no one in the field would agree to. But, if they did agree to them, then they would be
susceptible to the arguments of Go¨del and Benacerraf, making Penrose’s stronger argument
superfluous. These considerations together will show that even if Penrose’s argument were
valid, it would be surprisingly impotent.
3.1 Taxonomy of Theories
Up until now, I have followed the style of the logical literature in treating computational
theories as a coherent whole. This treatment is too simplistic though, as there are a number
of distinct sub-theories in computational psychology with their own unique assumptions
and methodologies. While the goal of this paper is not to give a comprehensive account of
all these different theories, it will be necessary going forward to lay out some basic categories
which these theories fall into. The tack will then be to examine how the assumptions made
in Penrose’s argument feature in each of the categories. In laying out and describing the
categories, I’ll follow the lead of Margaret Boden [2], who analyzes how the notion of
”computation” differs among computational theories. These differences let us distinguish
between formalist computational theories and competence computational theories. As it
will turn out, formalist theories are not subject to Go¨delian arguments whereas competence
ones are. But in order to see why that is, we need to look at how the two types differ.
3.1.1 Formalist computational theories
The first definition of computation we’ll consider is the one that features in formalist
theories. These theories define ’computation’, as Boden writes, ”as the formal manipulation
of abstract symbols, by the application of formal rules”(pg.229). So this definition matches
5This is different from the objections of Shapiro and Chalmers because while they are concerned with
how soundness leads to logical contradiction, I’m concerned with how they divorce the argument from many
CTM.
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closely the definition of computation that features in computer science, formal logic, etc.6
This is a boon to the formalist theories then because they are able to bring all the results
and methods of these other fields to bear on questions about the mind.
Exactly what role these formalisms are playing when they are employed in a compu-
tational theory is a matter of some controversy though. On the one hand, some theorists
consider the notion of computation as a useful explanatory metaphor. Whether or not
the brain is actually a computer is a question that may be beyond our powers of expla-
nation at the moment, but it has allowed to precisify a number of questions about how
cognition works. So on this view, as long as the assumption that the brain is some kind
of computer keeps yielding results, that is all the evidence needed to belive provisionally
that the assumption is true. On the other hand, some theorists make the stronger claim
that the brain literally does computations in exactly the same way that a computer does.
One such theorist is Zenon Pylyshyn, who draws on the notion of strong equivalence from
computer science to clarify this claim[23]. For him, mental processes are physically instan-
tiated in the brain in the exact same way as programs are instantiated in a computer’s
functional architecture. So then when we model these mental processes computationally,
we are not speaking metaphorically, but rather we’re describing what is actually going on
in the mind. This is an important distinction to highlight, because the formalist theories
which use computation metaphorically will exempt themselves from Penrose’s argument
more easily than those which use it as a modeling tool.
3.1.2 Competence computational theories
The notion of computation outlined above is the definition used in most of computational
psychology. As such, if any theory utilizing this notion can exempt itself from Go¨delian
arguments, then the majority of the field is exempted. By way of contrast, take the second
notion of computation that Boden highlights, due to David Marr[17]. In his work, Marr
distinguishes between three different levels of explanation that a sufficient account of mental
processes must contain: Computational, algorithmic, and mechanical. The mechanical
level is concerned with how the algorithmic level is implemented physiologically, and the
algorithmic level matches closely the types of explanation that formalist theories intend
to give. The level unique to Marr then is what he refers to as the ”computational” level.
What Marr refers to when he talks about ’computation’ is a strict input-output description
of some information processing task, abstracted away from the formalism that carries it
out. To illustrate this point, Marr has us consider the ”computational theory” of a cash
register at a grocery store. He argues that if the register is to perform its job correctly,
then it necessarily must satisfy the following properties:
6The scope of this definition is a little uncertain. In particular, it’s not at all clear whether connectionist
models of information processing can be captured under this formulation of ’computation’. For our purposes
though, it is enough to worry about those theories that claim that the computations the mind does are
Turing computable. Which theories in fact turn out to do so is another question.
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1. If you buy nothing, you pay nothing.
2. The order you buy things doesn’t matter.
3. Buying one batch of things first, then another batch of things next is the same as
buying them altogether.
4. If you buy something, and then return it, you have the same amount of money you
had before.
Since these constraints are really just the axioms for addition and zero in Robinson arith-
metic, Marr has us conclude that arithmetic is the proper computation for the register to
use. So then the computational theory does two things. First, it makes a priori arguments
for constraints on the operation, and secondly it gives an account of what operation satis-
fies these constraints. In short, the computational level gives the ”what” and the ”why”,
whereas the algorithmic and mechanical levels give the ”how”.
Marr’s notion of ’computation’ is striking for a couple of reasons. First, Marr refers to
as ’computational’ is more of a theoretical task-analysis than a traditional computation.
By saying that there is a level of computation that is independent of how it is actually
implemented, he is deviating from the accepted notion of computability. This separation
is not completely unique to Marr, as a comparable distinction between ”competence” and
”performance” appears in linguistics due to Chomsky. For Marr, an account of a computa-
tion isn’t concerned with how we actually carry it out (or whether it is possible to do so),
but rather what we would have to do if we were to carry it out. For this reason, Boden
refers to theories that take after Marr as ”competence” theories. Secondly, Marr thinks
that we can give a substantive account of the computational level of a theory by analyzing
a priori constraints on the task being carried out. But now notice that these assumptions
that Marr is making run parallel to those the Go¨delian makes when idealizing about the
set K. In the next subsection, we’ll show why this poses foundational issues for any theory
that takes after Marr.
3.2 Penrose vs. CTM, assumption wise
3.2.1 Epistemic foundations: Metaphor vs. Model
So now we are in a position to compare the assumptions made by the Go¨delian to those
that are made by different computational theories. Beginning with the formalist theories
described above, it is immediately apparent that those which consider the use of compu-
tational notions to be merely an important metaphor are not susceptible to the criticisms
of Lucas and Penrose. After all, both Lucas and Penrose argue by way of contradiction.
But if the assumption for contradiction (i.e. (1)- My arithmetic output is equivalent to
that of some Turing machine) is not something that the theorist takes to be literally true,
then it’s no issue when it’s shown to lead to absurdity. It doesn’t matter if an assumption
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that doesn’t feature in their research program is contradictory; as long as it keeps yielding
results, using computational methods is unproblematic.
As has already been said, not all who use this formalist notion of computability in their
research take it to be metaphorical. There are researchers in computational psychology (e.g.
Pylyshyn, Newell, Simon, etc.) who take the assertion that the mind is doing computations
to be literally true. But then it would seem like Penrose is off to the races because he is
now justified in assuming (1) and so his reductio argument, assuming it’s otherwise valid,
ought to go through. Since these theorists cannot extract themselves as easily as those
working with a metaphorical understanding, if they want to resist Penrose, they need to
find another assumption to take issue with.
The best next move for the computationalist is to object to Penrose’s assumption of
soundness. Following Putnam’s original objection to Lucas, the computationalist may
question what grounds Penrose has for asserting that our arithmetic output is sound. But
the computational theorist does not have the same liberty that Putnam has to make this
objection. Because while Putnam comes to the debate with no backgrounds commitments,
the computationalist has a horse in the race. They have ostensibly given an account in the
manner of computational psychology of our theorem proving activities. It would be a truly
remarkable feat if they managed to so do without appealing to any facts of arithmetic. But
barring the extraordinary, their arguments for their theory of arithmetic theorem proving
will itself rely on certain theorems of arithmetic. So to deny soundness would at first blush
seem to undercut their own work.7
This is not to say though that the formalist has no outs. It just means that some
subtlety is required. The subtlety involves distinguishing between the macro-process of
theorem proving generally, and the different sub-processes that make up the larger scale
process. For example, when we count (i.e. sum a series of 1’s) there is evidence that we
employ some sort of language processing, whereas we judge inequalities using visuo-spatial
representations [7]. So although both proving things about inequalities and proving things
about sums are part of the general process of ”doing arithmetic”, they themselves are
very different processes and would have different computational representations. But then
this gives the formalist his out. Because while it seems very likely that some arithmetic
reasoning would have to be involved in the defense of their computational theory, there’s
no reason to think this defense would exhaust all the different processes that make up
arithmetic reasoning. If he is able to isolate those processes involved in his theory and give
reasons (not necessarily a priori ones!) why these processes are internally sound, then he
has adequately defended his theory. But he makes no commitments to the global soundness
of our arithmetic practice, and thus doesn’t have to grant Penrose his assumption. Thus,
Penrose’s argument does not undermine his computational theory.
Before looking at how Penrose’s argument fairs against competence computational the-
7They could of course just remain neutral on the topic of soundness, and avoid the issue in this way.
But we’ll consider what happens if they want to give a stronger defense of their theory.
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ories, I want to head off a possible misunderstanding about the formalist’s exemption from
Penrose. The misunderstanding arises from this line of thinking: if the formalist can show
that the methods they used to derive their theory are arithmetically sound, then how is
it that the theory itself could be unsound? While this is an intuitive response, it doesn’t
correctly account for the nature of the formalists work. Even though there is arithmetic
reasoning involved in giving a computational account of arithmetic practice, there is also
wealth of empirical evidence (e.g. psychophysiological data from fMRIs) that goes into
the construction of computational theories. So then the formalist can both contend that
he made no errors in any sort of arithmetic used in interpreting the data, constructing a
model, etc. while also leaving open the possibility that various sections of the model may
contradict each other, making the model itself inconsistent and therefore unsound. But
such general questions about soundness lie outside the scope of a formalist theory. In-
terestingly, Marr’s introduction of his higher ”computational level” brings these questions
about global soundness into the fold of his theory, and thus get him into trouble. We can
now proceed to see why exactly this is the case.
3.2.2 Penrose’s due: Competence theories and soundness
So we saw above that Penrose’s argument fails to do work against formalist computational
theories because his assumption of soundness isn’t something that the formalist is commit-
ted to. But on the other hand, competence computational theories make more ambitious
foundational assumptions, and thus are vulnerable to Penrose’s argument.8 To show this
we have to establish two things: First, that the ”computational level” of the competence
theory picks out a set of arithmetic sentences with the same properties of K described
in 2.1 (i.e. recursively enumerable and countably infinite). Second, that the competence
theorist cannot avoid a commitment to soundness in the same way that formalist can. If
we can show these are the case, then it will be easy to show that Penrose’s argument goes
through against competence theories.
That a competence theory of arithmetic picks out a set of arithmetic sentences that
has the same properties of K follows directly from the definition of the ”computational
level” and from the distinction between competence for a computation and performance
in a computation. Recall from above that ”computational level” of a competence theory
establishes constraints on a certain computational task that its inputs and outputs must
satisfy if it is to do that task at all. Further, for the competence theorist, these constraints
are derived a priori from the definition of the task being carried out. As Boden summarizes
it, ”What is done- and how it must be done if it is to be done at all- is the focus of interest
[of the computational level]”. But then given these facts, the constraints on a competence
8Or rather, they would be if there were any competence theories in computational psychology concerning
how we do arithmetic. As far as I know, there are no such theories. However, given how influential Marr’s
work was in the field, it is not too far-fetched to think that one day someone may attempt to construct one.
The goal here is to preempt any such attempt.
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theory of arithmetic turn out to be simply the usual axioms for first order arithmetic. This
is because the operations of arithmetic are defined by these axioms, so if you are doing
arithmetic then you must be working within the scope of these axioms. In terms of input
and output then, given an input of some set of arithmetic sentences, the proper output
would be the set of arithmetic sentences which follow from the input set and the axioms of
arithmetic (let’s specifically let these axioms be those of Q for the sake of clarity). So any
computation that can be said to be doing arithmetic has to output, given the same input,
at least a subset of the larger set.
We have now a set of arithmetic sentences as the output of this competence theory, and
so all that’s left to establish is that its cardinality is countably infinite. To do so, we need
to revisit the distinction between ”competence” and ”performance”. As mentioned above,
this distinction is originally due to Chomsky, and is probably best explained in it’s original
context. For Chomsky, the distinction arose with respect to how we make use of the
rules of a generative grammar i.e. the rules of grammar that tell us how to construct
sentences. While performance is concerned with the actual construction of sentences,
Chomsky writes ”[competence] is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in
a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is
unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions,
shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic)”[5]. By following out
this line of reasoning, Chomsky conlcudes that humans have the competence to generate an
infinite number of sentences. So by now the parallel should be apparent. Instead of talking
about the generative rules for a natural language like English, we are looking at the axioms
of Q, and instead of considering those English sentences generated by an ”ideal speaker-
listener”, we consider those arithmetic sentences asserted by an ”ideal mathematician”.
So by utilizing this Chomskian notion of competence, the competence theorist has made
the exact same idealizations that the Go¨delian does. So, because the set of sentences
which follow from the axioms of Q is effectively generated and has infinite cardinality, the
competence theorist is committed to the fact that the set of arithmetic sentences that make
up the output for his theory be countably infinite. Thus, at the ”computational level”, a
competence theory picks out a recursively enumerable set K of arithmetic sentences.
At this point things are looking good for Penrose. The competence theorist is committed
to the idealized output K of some human mathematician being recursively enumerable
and therefore equivalent to the output of some Turing machine M. This gives Penrose
his reductio assumption (1). If he is granted further that K is sound, then he can push
his argument through. Now Penrose has to say, as he did to the formalist, that the
assumption of soundness is implicit in the competence theorist’s defense of his model of
human arithmetical practice. The competence theorist can reply in one of a few ways. He
can attempt to make the same counter-argument that the formalist made; namely, that
his claim of soundness is a restricted one and thus doesn’t give Penrose a strong enough
assumption to carry his argument through. Should this response fail, the competence
theorist could then claim that he uses some other reasoning besides arithmetic reasoning
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to come to see that his theory is sound. Lastly, he might just deny that he has to assert his
theory to be sound. It would clearly be ideal then if one of the first two lines worked. As
we’ll see though, because the competence theorist insists that a complete computational
theory gives an account of the ”computational level”, they don’t.
Let’s first pursue the formalist’s response, and see how it works for the competence
theorist. When faced with the charge that they can’t assert a computational theory of
human arithmetical practice that isn’t sound because the defense of the theory relies on
arithmetic, the tack was to restrict the claim of soundness to only those involved in proving
the theory. Thus they deny Penrose the global soundness needed to make his argument,
and free themselves up to develop theories at the ”algorithmic level” (to use Marr’s term
mentioned previously). But for the competence theorist, the introduction of the ”computa-
tional level” complicates things. Because by asserting that the arithmetic the competence
theorist used in contracting his model is sound, he asserts that the rules governing that
arithmetic (i.e. the axioms at the computational level) are also sound. But then, so long
as he utilizes addition and multiplication in defending his theory, he has implicitly asserted
that the axioms generating K are sound. But now Penrose has the assumption for (2) in
addition to that of (1), so he has all he needs to level his argument.
In response, the competence theorist could then deny that the reasoning used in seeing
the soundness of his theory were arithmetic. However, it could be argued that this leads to
regression similar to those seen in association with Turing-Feferman reflection principles.
Because by claiming that he sees his competence theory to be sound, he implies that he
sees it to be consistent. But the consistency of his system can be rendered as an arithmetic
sentence. Thus, regardless of the method he used to come to see consistency, he has come
to assert an arithmetic sentence. Thus, this ought to be captured in the the output set K
9. Of course by Go¨del’s theorem, whatever mechanisms the competence theorist postulates
at the algorithmic level cannot output K will not output Con(K). So in order to capture
Con(K) he will need to postulate a new output set K1 of some augmented theory. But
then the dialectic repeats, leaving us with a K2 and then a K3 and so on. However, unlike
the trasnfinite numbers in T-F reflections, the human mind does not go on forever. So at
last there would have to be some Kn such that given m ≤ n, Km ⊆ Kn. Thus the arms
race would end and Penrose could wage his argument using Kn in (1).
So the last option for the competence theorist would be to remain completely impartial
to the soundness of his theory. Clearly, this option denies Penrose his assumption for
(2) and thus his argument wouldn’t go through. But notice that Penrose can still claim
the following conditional: If the mind is in fact a computer, then no competence-style
computational theory of human arithmetic practice can be completed and known to be
sound. This seems to be a fairly damning result for the competence theorist.
9At this point, the competence theorist might object, because K is ostensibly the output an ideal
mathematician, and how closely the theorist matches the idealized mathematician is not known. To make
this objection though, the theorist would have to steer clear of Preface Paradox like concerns. Whether or
not this is possible is an interesting question, but too involved to go into at the moment.
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3.2.3 Giving Go¨del and Benaceraff their dues too
While Penrose’s conditional is a fairly striking result, it is not an altogether unique one.
Consider the logically equivalent statement ”It is not the case that the mind is a computer
and also a competence-style computational theory of human arithmetic practice can be
completed and known to be sound. But compare this to another quote from Go¨del’s Gibbs
lecture: ”However, if [a finite rule generating K] exists, then we with our human under-
standing could certainly never know it to be such...we could never know with mathematical
certainty that all propositions it produces are correct”[10]. So then while there might be a
system that generates all the truths of ”subjective mathematics”, it could never be known
to be such and also be known to be consistent, which precludes it from being known to
be sound. This is just a restatement of Penrose’s conclusion then, but it is a restatement
that is much more direct and came 43 years prior to the publication of SOM. So given this
Penrose’s argument seems an unnecessary complication.
Now it may be objected: ”Yes, Go¨del anticipated Penrose’s result, but Penrose ex-
plicated the logic and made it more precise. So it wasn’t a useless effort”. This is true,
Penrose gives a clever and exact argument whereas Go¨del’s talk is more along the lines of
a proof sketch. But this doesn’t save Penrose from the charge of redundancy, because in
1967 Paul Benacerraf weighed in on the matter with a very exact 20 step derivation[1].
At the end of it, he writes: ”At best Go¨del’s theorems imply... that given any Turing
machine Wj , either I cannot prove that Wj is adequate for arithmetic, or if I am a subset
of Wj then I cannot prove that I can prove everything Wj can.... In a relevant sense,
if I am a Turing machine, then perhaps I cannot ascertain which one”. He adds as an
afterthought, ”Of course, I might be an inconsistent Turing machine.” Obviously, if you
are an inconsistent Turing machine, then it is possible to assert your own consistency, but
that assertion just happens to be wrong. But then this result also captures the conditional
Penrose has shown. Because if we are a computer, then either we can’t determine what
our own program is and so can’t determine the axioms governing our output or we are an
inconsistent computer. But if we can’t determine the axioms or the program, then neither
the computational level nor algorithmic level of a competence computational theory of
arithmetic would be completable. So then we conclude that if we are a computer, either
we are an inconsistent one, or we cannot give a complete competence computational theory
of arithmetic, which is exactly what Penrose is entitled to conclude.
So now, finally, we have demonstrated everything involved in my ”new criticism” of
Penrose’s argument. On the one hand, it was shown that Penrose’s arguments fail to do
significant work against formalist theories in computational psychology, which account for
the majority of the field. On the other hand, the work it does against competence theories
is not unique to it. The same work is done by the arguments of Go¨del and Benacerraf,
and these arguments are clearer and more precise. Therefore Penrose’s argument is at best
superfluous.
18
4 Conclusion
Having criticized Penrose’s argument, all that is left to do before ending this discussion
is to briefly examine where the debate stands. And while the arguments have done work
to show exactly where Penrose’s argument (were it valid) would stand in the dialectic,
nothing in this paper, including Penrose’s argument, has advanced the dialectic itself. So
I’ll end with a brief treatment of what might be required to break this stalemate.
The computationalist comes out of this debate relatively unscathed, having lost only
the ability to have a knowably sound and complete competence theory that contains an
account of our arithmetic activity. They are free to construct theories about other mental
processes in this manner though, as Marr did with vision, so long as they omit talk of
arithmetic. And as we saw, they can give accounts about our arithmetic activities under a
formalist style of theory, so long as they are appropriately modest about their soundness
claims. However, these are all only theoretical concerns at the moment: the actual process
by which we do arithmetic is likely to be very complicated, so that we won’t have the
technological know-how to study it rigorously for some time. When we get there, it will
most likely change the face of this debate. But until then, things remain at a stand still.
On the other hand, the Go¨delian seems to have his hands tied. He has gone as far as
formal reasoning can take him, but he has still not exceeded the capabilities of a machine.
And upon reflection, this is not surprising. After all, formal logic is just a set of rules
for the manipulation of symbols, and we know that machines are very good at applying
such rules. Why then should we think that A) we can out do the machine in this way
and B) demonstrate that we can do so? Thought about more generally, if one were able
to show that he could out do any machine, then in order to convince others that this is
the case they would need to communicate a proof to them. In order to do this though,
they would have to represent whatever reasoning led them to this conclusion in a known
symbolic language. But what is to stop a machine then from simulating this representation,
thus ”proving” it can out do any machine. In short, because our notion of ”proof” implies
the ability to communicate the truth of your statement, and it would be impossible to
convey the truth of a mathematical statement without using symbols, it seems impossible
to prove with mathematical certainty that you can outdo any given machine in a way that
is inaccessible to the machine. It would require a very different notion of mathematical
”truth” and ”proof” before we could hope to give such a demonstration. Strangely enough,
Go¨del anticipates the eventual creation of such a paradigm, writing: ”Namely, it turns out
that in the systematic establishment of the axioms of mathematics, new axioms, which
do not follow by formal logic from those previously established, again and again become
evident. It is not at all excluded by the negative results mentioned earlier that nevertheless
every clearly posed mathematical yes-or-no question is solvable in this way. For it is just
this becoming evident of more and more new axioms on the basis of the meaning of the
primitive notions that a machine cannot imitate”[11]. Put simply, the raw intuition we
have that our unproven axioms are true is the type of reasoning that separates us from
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machines. However, whether a systematic explication of this kind of intuition is possible
is dubious, and at the very least a long way off. So it looks like things will remain locked
up on the Go¨delian side for the foreseeable future. And so we end our discussion, leaving
the dialectic still in a draw, but with Penrose at least now squarely situated within it.
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